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Robert Aumann and Thomas Schelling have contributed to enhancing our understanding of 
conﬂict and cooperation. They have achieved this by extending and applying game theory – a method 
used to analyze strategic interaction among different agents. Their work has transformed the social sci-
ences far beyond the boundaries of economics. Aumann’s and Schelling’s research continues to shape 
the debate on the formation of social institutions.
Conflict and cooperation through the lens of  
game theory
In human interaction, a single individual can seldom determine what will happen; everyone 
can to some extent affect the outcome. For example, if someone in a two-party relation can 
choose between two alternative courses of action and the other party has three options, there 
are a total of 2 x 3 = 6 possible outcomes. The two parties usually have different evaluations 
of these outcomes and act on the basis of which alternative they think the other party will 
choose. Many interactions involve several steps over time and it is not unusual for them to be 
associated with asymmetric information, i.e., some parties know something which others do 
not. The analysis of strategic interaction – of all kinds – is the essence of game theory. The 
term itself brings to mind games in everyday life. But, as this year’s Laureates have shown, 
the most important applications of game theory are to be found in such vital issues as secu-
rity and disarmament policies, price formation on markets, as well as economic and political 
negotiations.
Negotiations in the Shadow of the Cold War
In the mid-1950s, Thomas Schelling began to apply game-theory methods to one of the era’s 
most vital issues – global security and the arms race. As Schelling himself noted, considerable 
progress can be achieved simply by drawing a diagram which describes the alternatives avai-
lable to the opponent and to one’s own country, followed by systematic consideration of the 
outcome in the different cases. Such a process also serves as a reminder that the other party 
in a conﬂict faces a similar decision-making problem.
Schelling was particularly intrigued by the ways in which the parties’ negotiating strength 
could be affected by different factors, such as the initial alternatives at their disposal and 
their potential to inﬂuence their own and each others’ alternatives during the process. He 
clariﬁed why it could be advantageous to limit one’s own alternatives or worsen one’s own 
options – literally to burn one’s bridges. He was also interested in the process of establishing a 
climate of conﬁdence, whereby long-term cooperation could be built up over a period of time, 
and in the long-run gains a party could achieve by making short-run concessions. The results 
of Schelling’s work were published in his book, The Strategy of Conﬂict (1960), which became a 
classic and has inﬂuenced generations of strategic thinkers.
Other researchers have extended several of the concepts in Schelling’s book. His ideas 
regarding credible threats and limitations on one’s own alternatives were later formalized by 
Reinhard Selten, an Economics Laureate in 1994. Schelling’s formulation of the prerequisites 
for cooperation has elicited extensive research on the origins and development of cooperation 
over time between parties who initially lacked conﬁdence in one another.
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situations without any strong conﬂict of interest, but where unsuccessful coordination would 
give rise to high costs for all parties. In his research, including classroom experiments with his 
students, Schelling found that coordinative solutions – which he called focal points – could be 
arrived at more often than predicted by theory. The ability to coordinate appears to be related 
to the parties’ common frames of reference. Social conventions and norms are integral parts 
of this common ground. Schelling’s work in this area inspired the philosopher David Lewis to 
specify the idea that language originated as a means of coordination.
Why Does Segregation Arise?
A recurring theme in Thomas Schelling’s research is: what happens when individual plans 
and patterns of behavior are confronted in the social arena? The title of one of his most widely 
read books, Micromotives and Macrobehavior (1978), reveals the overall theme. The book addresses dif-
ferent everyday phenomena such as professional ice-hockey players’ use of helmets, audiences’ 
choice of seats in an auditorium, and racial and sexual discrimination.
Segregation is usually associated with oppression. Historically, this has been an important 
part of the explanation, but segregation is also a stable phenomenon in developed societies, 
where considerable effort is devoted to counteracting it. Schelling formulated a simple model 
where he assumed that all individuals are tolerant in the sense that they willingly live in the 
proximity of people with a different culture, religion or skin color, but that they want to have 
at least a few neighbors that share their own characteristics. If not, then they move to a neigh-
borhood where they can ﬁnd more people like themselves. Schelling showed that even rather 
weak preferences regarding the share of like persons in a neighborhood can result in strongly 
segregated living patterns. In other words, no extreme preferences on the part of individuals 
are required in order for a social problem to arise.
Long-run Cooperation 
While Tomas Schelling’s strength lies largely in his ability to introduce original ideas and 
concepts with a minimum of mathematical technique, Robert Aumann’s primary contribu-
tions consist of using the tools of mathematical analysis to develop concepts and hypotheses, 
provide them with concise formulations and draw precise conclusions. He once likened his 
research to artistic creativity – as “expressing through a difﬁcult or resistive medium”
Aumann shared Schelling’s early interest in interaction where the parties interact many 
times over a long period, so-called repeated games. He showed that peaceful cooperation is 
often an equilibrium solution in a repeated game, even between parties with strong short-
run conﬂicts of interest. Aumann and other researchers have extended and generalized his 
results in different directions, for example regarding credibility in “threats of punishment” 
for deviating from cooperation. Aumann, in joint work with Michael Maschler, also establis-
hed the theory of repeated games with asymmetric (or, more generally, incomplete) informa-
tion, i.e., situations where one party knows more than another about certain aspects of the 
repeated game, for example concerning the real costs of a competitor or the military strength 
of another country. 
The theory of repeated games is now the common framework for analysis of long-run coo-
peration in the social sciences. Applications extend from competing ﬁrms which collude to 
maintain a high price level, and farmers who share pastures or irrigation systems, to countries 
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Common Knowledge and Correlated Equilibria
Another of Aumann’s fundamental contributions concerns the cognitive foundations of game 
theory, i.e., the implications of the parties’ knowledge about the various aspects of the game, 
including “knowledge about each others’ knowledge”. In the early days of game theory, analy-
sis was often simpliﬁed by assuming that the parties know everything about all aspects of the 
game, in analogy, e.g., to physics, where friction or air resistance are sometimes disregarded. 
Knowledge that another party is rational can affect one’s own behavior, as will knowledge 
about someone else’s knowledge about one’s own rationality, and so on. Aumann’s formaliza-
tion of the concept of common knowledge allowed for systematic analysis of the relation bet-
ween the knowledge of the parties and the outcome of the game.
Aumann  also  introduced  a  new  equilibrium  concept,  correlated  equilibrium,  which  is 
weaker than Nash equilibrium, the solution concept developed by John Nash, an economics 
laureate in 1994. Correlated equilibrium can explain why it may be advantageous for negotia-
ting parties to allow an impartial mediator to speak to the parties either jointly or separately, 
and in some instances give them different information.
The Limits of Rationality
As scholars, Robert Aumann and Thomas Schelling have distinctive proﬁles, but throughout 
their research they have shared a common trait: an interest in considering aspects neglected 
by established theory and in developing new concepts and analytical tools, thereby extending 
the scope of analysis. A consequence of these endeavors is that the concept of rationality 
now has a wider interpretation; behavior which used to be classiﬁed as irrational has become 
understandable and rational. Their work has contributed signiﬁcantly to bridging the gap 
between economics and other behavioral and social sciences.
FURTHER READING
A great deal of Schelling’s work is accessible to non-specialists and many of Aumann’s publications contain 
non-technical discussions of his mathematical results. Dixit and Nalebuff (1991) offer a highly readable 
introduction to game theory with a focus on applications. Dixit and Skeath (2004) provide an introductory 
textbook, whereas Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and Myerson (1991) give more advanced and technical expo-
sitions. Biographical and personal details about the laureates may be found in Zeckhauser’s (1989) portrait of 
Schelling and in Hart’s (2005) interview with Aumann. 
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Links
At the ofﬁcial Nobel website, http://nobelprize.org, one can ﬁnd , e.g. the press conference as web-TV. There 
is also a scientiﬁc article, for the more advanced reader.
Links and Further Reading: www.kva.se/swe/awards/nobel/economy/press/ecoread05.asp
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